Can websites in Google search results still be dangerous?

Search results are often treated as a sign that a website is safe. In practice, that is not always the case.

Search engines work continuously to identify harmful or compromised sites, but unsafe pages can still appear for a period of time before they are detected and removed.

This guide explains how that happens, what these pages may try to do, and how to reduce the risk when browsing.

Use the links below to jump to the section most relevant to your question.

• • • How websites normally appear in search results
    • How unsafe or compromised pages appear
    • Why fake support numbers can appear through search or AI tools
    • What these pages try to do
    • Why unsafe pages may lead to session theft
    • How lookalike domains and websites can appear legitimate
    • Why browser protections do not always stop them
    • What to check before interacting with a page
    • What to do if something unexpected happens
    • How to reduce the risk when browsing
    • Why this matters for real accounts and services
    • Supporting references
    • Further Guidance and Support

Search engines index pages by analysing content, links, and behaviour. Results are ranked based on relevance and structure.

This process works well in most cases, but it is not designed to guarantee that every result is safe.

Unsafe pages can appear in search results when legitimate sites are compromised, when new sites are created to look useful, or when harmful content briefly passes detection.

These pages may only be visible for a short time, but that can still be enough to affect users.

Sometimes the unsafe result is not a fake website at all, but a legitimate site that has been compromised. Documented WordPress incidents have shown that malicious content can be introduced through previously trusted components and, in some cases, presented differently to search engines while the website owner continues to see apparently normal pages.

The enduring lesson is that a website can be genuine and still become unsafe. An established domain, previous search history or familiar appearance does not prove that the site’s current content or behaviour has not changed.

Search risk is not limited to unsafe pages. In some cases, the risk is the contact information shown to the user. Fraudsters may attempt to manipulate search results, online listings or AI generated answers so that a person looking for help is shown a fake customer service number.

Virgin Media O2 has warned that UK consumers have encountered fake customer service numbers generated or surfaced by AI tools and search engines. The risk is that a person may believe they are calling a trusted provider, but instead speak to a criminal who asks for personal information, payment details, remote access or account changes.

This is especially relevant when someone is under pressure and wants a quick answer. If a support number is found through a search result, advert, forum, AI answer or unfamiliar listing, it is safer to verify it against the provider’s official website, app, bill, account portal or known customer documentation before calling.

Once opened, unsafe pages may:

• redirect the browser
• trigger downloads
• request permissions
• display misleading prompts
• load unwanted scripts

These actions are often subtle and depend on user interaction.

Some unsafe pages do not only try to steal a password. They may try to persuade the user to download malware, install an extension, run a command, approve a fake verification prompt, or follow instructions that compromise the device.

That matters because once malware is running on a device, the risk can extend beyond the page that caused the problem. Google explains that sophisticated malware can read local files and memory where browsers store authentication cookies, and that software alone cannot reliably prevent cookie exfiltration once that level of compromise has happened.

Newer protections such as Device Bound Session Credentials can reduce the value of stolen cookies where the browser, device and service support them. However, they do not make unsafe pages safe. They also do not remove the need to avoid suspicious downloads, fake verification prompts, unnecessary browser extensions, command prompts or unusual permission requests.

This is why a suspicious page should not be judged only by how it looks. A safe looking cookie notice, privacy message, verification box or download prompt can still be dangerous if it asks the user to download a file, run a command, install an extension, paste text into a terminal or approve unusual permissions.

Many unsafe pages are designed to appear normal.

They may include:

• • professional design
  • familiar wording such as privacy or security
  • cookie or consent prompts
  • content matching the search query
  • logos, colours or terminology associated with a real organisation.

The website address itself may also be part of the deception.

Small changes to a familiar domain name

An attacker does not necessarily need to compromise the real organisation’s domain. A separate domain can be registered that has been chosen to look similar to it.

For example, a legitimate domain such as:

example.com

could be imitated using something such as:

examp1e.com

examplle.com

example-support.com

The differences may be obvious when two addresses are compared side by side, but they can be much easier to miss when someone is reading an email, search result, text message or QR code quickly.

This type of imitation is commonly associated with typosquatting.

Characters that look like other letters

Domain names can also contain characters from writing systems other than the basic Latin alphabet.

Some characters from different alphabets can look very similar to familiar letters such as:

a

e

o

p

c

Two domain names can therefore look almost identical to a person while being treated as different names by the browser and DNS system.

This type of deception is often described as a homoglyph or homograph attack.

Why Punycode may appear

Internationalised Domain Names, usually called IDNs, allow domain names to represent characters used by many different languages.

Because the underlying DNS system needs an ASCII-compatible representation of these names, an internationalised domain can be converted into a format known as Punycode.

A Punycode domain normally begins with:

xn--

Seeing xn-- does not mean that a website is malicious. Legitimate internationalised domains also use Punycode.

However, understanding this mechanism helps explain why an address that appears visually familiar may contain different characters from the domain a person intended to visit.

Familiar words can also appear in a misleading subdomain

The important part of a web address is not always the first familiar name that appears.

For example:

microsoft.example.com

is part of the example.com domain.

The word microsoft is a subdomain controlled by whoever controls example.com. Its presence does not establish any connection with Microsoft.

The same principle applies to addresses containing words such as:

secure

login

account

payment

or the name of a familiar organisation.

A familiar word somewhere in a longer web address should therefore not be treated as proof that the site belongs to that organisation.

A different domain ending also creates a different domain

A familiar name registered under another top-level domain is also a separate address.

For example:

example.com

and

example.co

are different domain names.

The same applies to other endings such as .net, .org, .uk, .info and the many newer top-level domains now available.

A different ending does not automatically mean that a site is unsafe, but it should be checked where it is not the address normally associated with the organisation.

HTTPS does not prove that a lookalike domain is genuine

A misleading website can still use HTTPS and have a valid TLS certificate.

HTTPS and digital-certificate validation help the browser establish a protected connection to the domain it is visiting and check that the server can present a certificate that is valid for that domain.

They do not establish that the domain belongs to the organisation the person believes they are visiting.

For example:

Expected domain

example.com

Different lookalike domain

examp1e.com

If the owner of examp1e.com obtains a valid certificate for that domain, HTTPS can operate normally.

The browser is securely communicating with examp1e.com.

The problem is that the person may have mistaken it for example.com.

A useful distinction is:

Search result
tells the user that a search engine has surfaced a page
↓
Domain name
identifies the address the browser is trying to reach
↓
HTTPS/TLS and certificate validation
help protect and authenticate the connection to that domain
↓
Website identity, content and behaviour
still need to be considered separately

None of those steps by itself means “this website is safe.”

This is why checking the address remains relevant even where other security controls are present.

Before entering credentials, approving a sign-in request, providing payment details or disclosing sensitive information, check the actual domain rather than relying only on the appearance of the page or familiar words within the address.

Where an important request is unexpected, it may also be appropriate to reach the organisation through a known website, existing bookmark, official application or independently verified contact method rather than following the supplied link.

Modern browsers include several security mechanisms, including harmful-site warnings, download checks, permission controls, certificate validation and other protections. These controls help reduce risk, but they cannot identify every unsafe situation immediately.

A newly created malicious page may not yet have an established harmful reputation. A legitimate website may only recently have been compromised. An attacker may also use a trusted platform or rely on the person visiting the page to approve a download, extension, permission request or other action.

Keeping the browser supported and fully updated remains important because available security fixes should be applied. However, fully updated does not mean invulnerable. Browsers are complex software and may contain weaknesses that have not yet been discovered or for which an effective fix is not yet available.

Browser protection should therefore be understood as one security layer rather than proof that every page which opens without a warning is safe.

Before interacting with an unfamiliar page, check:

• whether it requests permissions immediately
• whether downloads begin unexpectedly
• whether the address matches expectations
• whether behaviour feels consistent
• whether a phone number, support link or contact form can be verified from the provider’s official website, app, bill or customer portal

If something seems unusual, it is safer to leave the page.

For a more detailed explanation of browser behaviour, permissions, and practical checks, see our guide on browser security and privacy.

If a page behaves unexpectedly and you have not entered information, approved anything or run a download:

• close the tab
• do not approve prompts or notifications
• avoid downloads
• do not install extensions or run commands suggested by the page
• review any browser permissions that may already have been granted.

If you entered a password, approved a sign in request, installed software, ran a command, granted remote access or supplied sensitive information, simply closing the page may not be enough.

The next steps then depend on what happened. They may include reviewing the account from a known clean device, changing exposed credentials, revoking active sessions, removing unexpected permissions, checking the affected device with its security software, isolating it from important systems, or obtaining technical help before continuing to use it for sensitive work.

A useful distinction is:

Page looked suspicious but nothing was approved, entered or executed
↓
Leave the page and review what happened

Credentials, permissions, software, commands or remote access were involved
↓
Treat it as a possible security incident and establish what may have been affected

A practical approach to browsing reduces the likelihood of interacting with unsafe or misleading pages, even when they appear in normal search results.

Several different controls may act at different stages:

Search engine
helps find and rank information, but does not guarantee that every result is safe
↓
DNS filtering
may block a requested domain where it matches known threat information or configured policy
↓
HTTPS/TLS
helps protect the connection to the domain and authenticate the server identity presented for it
↓
Browser protections
may warn about harmful pages, downloads, certificates or unusual behaviour
↓
Endpoint protection
provides another layer if harmful software or behaviour reaches the device

Each layer has limits. A filtering DNS service cannot be expected to know about every newly created or newly compromised destination. HTTPS does not prove that a website is legitimate. Browser warnings may not yet exist for a new threat, and endpoint protection cannot guarantee that every new or unusual attack will be identified immediately.

Practical browsing therefore still matters. Check the address before entering credentials, be cautious where a page unexpectedly requests downloads or permissions, and verify important support details through a known source rather than relying only on information that appeared in search results.

For website owners, the same principle works in reverse. A compromised website can affect visitors and search visibility even while its homepage appears normal during an ordinary check. Website monitoring, supported software, account protection, DNS security, backups and recovery planning therefore need to work together.

Our dedicated NextDNS guide explains DNS filtering in more detail, while our browser security and privacy guide explains browser permissions, Secure DNS and other browser controls.

Browsers are used to access email, banking, Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, supplier portals, websites and other business systems. A problem that begins with one search result can therefore extend beyond the webpage itself.

For example:

Unsafe or compromised page
↓
Password, permission, download or session is exposed
↓
Account or device may be affected
↓
Connected email, files or business services may also become relevant

This is why browsing security belongs within the wider layered-security approach rather than being treated as a browser-only problem.

Prevention remains important, but organisations should also know how important accounts can be recovered, how sessions or application access can be revoked, how an affected device can be isolated, and whether important business information can be restored if an incident reaches beyond the original webpage.

The wider model is:

Prevent → Detect → Contain → Recover → Learn → Improve

The objective is not to assume that every unsafe page will be detected. It is to reduce the opportunity for harm and retain practical options if one of the earlier protections does not work as expected.

Supporting references for this guide include Virgin Media O2’s warning about fake customer service numbers surfaced by AI tools and search engines, Microsoft guidance on technical support scams, Anchor Hosting’s technical report on the WordPress plugin supply chain incident, and TechCrunch’s public reporting on the same incident.

Microsoft: Protect yourself from tech support scams.

Someone Bought 30 WordPress Plugins and Planted a Backdoor in All of Them.

TechCrunch: WordPress plugin supply chain backdoor incident.

Virgin Media O2: warning about fake customer service numbers surfaced by AI tools and search engines.

This guide forms part of a broader layered security approach. For structured guidance on security and resilience planning, see our Security and Resilience page.

For information about practical implementation and ongoing support, you can review our IT services and local IT support coverage across London, Hertfordshire, and Essex.

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Author
Elías Sánchez
IT Support Consultant
Evening Computing

This guide was prepared by Elías Sánchez with research and drafting assistance from AI tools. All technical content has been reviewed and adapted for clarity and accuracy.

Last reviewed
2 October 2026